Israel and Lebanon signed a US-brokered framework agreement in Washington on Friday, June 26, turning months of cautious negotiations into a formal diplomatic process.
But the deal’s hardest test is only beginning: whether Lebanon can impose state authority in the south while Hezbollah remains armed, powerful, and opposed to the arrangement.
The agreement, signed at the State Department by Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad, and US State Department Counselor Daniel Holler, sets out a performance-based path toward ending the conflict, restoring Lebanese sovereignty, and moving toward peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries.
Under the framework, the Lebanese Armed Forces are to assume full security responsibility in two initial “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.
Israeli forces are to redeploy from those areas once the disarmament of nonstate armed groups and the dismantling of their military infrastructure are verified. Future pilot zones are to be agreed upon by Israel and Lebanon, with US support and verification.
The agreement also calls for a US-supported military coordination group to oversee implementation and a security annex to define the measures, verification mechanisms, and arrangements needed to move the process forward. Washington also pledged support for the Lebanese army and humanitarian assistance for Lebanon.
On paper, the agreement is a breakthrough. Israel and Lebanon recognize each other’s right to live in peace as neighboring sovereign states and say they intend to end the conflict and, eventually, any state of war between them.
In practice, the bargain remains the one that shaped the talks from the start: Lebanon wants Israeli forces out and sovereignty restored; Israel wants proof that Hezbollah will be disarmed and kept away from the border.
Hezbollah’s rejection came quickly. The group called the framework a surrender, rejected any link between Israeli withdrawal and its own disarmament, and made clear it would not be bound by an agreement from which it was excluded. The response was predictable, but it showed the gap between the official negotiating table and Lebanon’s actual balance of power.
Washington is trying to present the process as an agreement between two sovereign states. Israel is treating it as a security test. Lebanon is framing it as a first step toward reclaiming territory and authority in the south. Hezbollah sees it as an attempt to strip away the source of its power.
During the war, something appeared to shift inside Lebanon. The old taboo around Israel did not disappear, but it was tested more openly than in previous years.
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam moved directly against Hezbollah’s independent military role, declaring Hezbollah’s military activities illegal and calling on Lebanese security forces to prevent attacks launched from Lebanese territory.
President Joseph Aoun also framed the crisis through the language of state sovereignty, legitimate institutions, and the need for the Lebanese state to recover control over decisions of war and peace.
Signs of change were visible beyond official statements. Israeli and Lebanese speakers appeared in Lebanese television debates and public media formats, including on MTV Lebanon, in moments that would have been politically unthinkable only a few years earlier. At the same time, polling suggested a more complicated Lebanese public mood.
According to a survey conducted by Information International and published by Al-Jadeed, based on 2,000 respondents across Lebanese regions and religious communities between April 28 and May 5, 2026, a majority of Lebanese supported reaching a peace agreement with Israel, although views remained sharply divided by sect.
L’Orient Today reported that Al-Jadeed did not provide additional methodological details, an important caveat given the sensitivity of the findings.
The poll found support for a peace agreement with Israel at 84% among Druze respondents, 77% among Maronites, 72% among Orthodox Christians, and 52% among Sunnis.
By contrast, 92% of Shiite respondents opposed such a move.
On Hezbollah’s weapons, 58% of respondents supported disarming the group, while 34% opposed it. Support for disarmament was strongest among Orthodox Christians at 89%, Maronites at 87%, and Druze at 77%, while opposition was highest among Shiites at 88% and Sunnis at 70%.
The poll did not show a Lebanese consensus in favor of Israel. It pointed to something narrower but still important: the taboo around discussing Israel, Hezbollah’s weapons, and negotiations has weakened, especially outside the Shiite community and after a war many Lebanese increasingly view through the costs of Hezbollah’s military independence.
Azzam, a Lebanese political analyst who asked to be identified by his first name only, told The Media Line that the earlier signs of Lebanese openness came at a moment when the Iranian axis appeared unusually vulnerable, particularly during the height of US attacks on Iran.
If Iran and Hezbollah retain their influence, Azzam said, Lebanese political actors will have to adjust accordingly. That would mean not simply accepting the status quo, but negotiating a new one internally, including understandings that leave Hezbollah satisfied with its relationships with other political players.
That internal Lebanese realignment is one reason the Washington agreement remains fragile. The Lebanese government has signed the framework, but its ability to enforce it depends on whether Hezbollah accepts the terms, obstructs them, or chooses to test the arrangement militarily.
Azzam said there are already discussions involving Iran and Hezbollah over whether the Lebanese government can speak for them in negotiations or only for the state.
If Beirut speaks only for state institutions, he said, its ability to enforce any agreement would be severely limited.
“He might sign whatever he signs, and then Hezbollah throws a rocket, and it all collapses,” Azzam said.
“This is now where the main negotiations are happening within Lebanon,” he added.
Nir Boms, a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center, framed the Lebanon file through the same regional divide, but from a different angle.
He said the issue is now being pulled between two camps: one that wants to keep the Lebanese front linked to Iran, and another that sees the current moment as an opportunity to weaken Hezbollah and reassert Lebanese sovereignty.
“There are two camps in this region when it comes to what we’re seeing now in front of us, and the linkage between the Iran arena and the Lebanese arena,” Boms told The Media Line. “The Iranians and some of their allies would like to see the linkage continue.”
Boms said Iran has tried to fold Lebanon into its broader regional narrative, presenting Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as part of a wider Israeli retreat and seeking to keep Hezbollah relevant as a political and military actor.
But he argued that many in the region, including many Lebanese, understand the danger of allowing Hezbollah to retain that role.
For Boms, the question is not simply whether a ceasefire can be preserved; it is whether Lebanon can function as a sovereign state while armed proxy forces control territory beyond the reach of the Lebanese army.
Boms said that point has not been missed by negotiators or by Lebanese officials he has spoken with.
“The time when Israelis cannot meet Lebanese is also beginning to be a thing of the past,” he added.
The agreement points to a rare overlap between some Israeli and Lebanese interests, even though the two sides still disagree over sequencing. Israel says redeployment must be tied to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the demilitarization of the area.
Lebanon says Israeli withdrawal is needed first, both to restore sovereignty and to give the army room to operate.
Boms said his conversations with Lebanese counterparts have convinced him that there may be more room for practical coordination than public statements suggest.
Still, he warned that any arrangement that strengthens Iran’s proxies would leave Lebanon exposed to another conflict.
“If there’s going to be a framework that will push Iran further in and will allow Iran to continue to strengthen its proxies, Lebanon will lose,” Boms said.
The skepticism is not limited to Israel. Inside Lebanon, the political balance remains divided, and Azzam argued that despite recent signs of openness to talks or normalization in some circles, the country’s power structure remains largely hostile to Israel.
He said Lebanon’s Christians remain split between factions more open to normalization and those aligned, or willing to work, with Hezbollah. Sunnis, he said, are also divided, while Shiite political power remains overwhelmingly opposed to normalization.
Azzam said President Aoun has tried to maneuver between those camps, leaning closer to Hezbollah when its position appeared stronger and closer to the Americans when Washington appeared to have the upper hand.
Lebanon’s sectarian and political alignments still leave the pro-normalization camp with limited power, Azzam said.
He pointed to Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Shiite Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri as influential figures who remain strongly opposed to Israel, while Christians and Sunnis are divided.
That balance matters because the agreement is not being implemented in a vacuum. Hezbollah rejects full disarmament, Israel maintains positions in southern Lebanon, and the Lebanese government is trying to avoid an internal confrontation that could further destabilize the country.
Azzam said the apparent openness in Lebanon should not be overstated.
“Perhaps at the popular level it did for a bit, but politically it hasn’t changed all that much, and it’s still largely anti-Israel until now,” he said.
Azzam said he was not confident in the polling methodology and argued that a power map of Lebanon’s political actors shows much less strength on the pro-normalization side than the numbers suggest.
Even with the government formally on board, implementation will depend on the Lebanese army’s capacity, Hezbollah’s response, and the willingness of Lebanon’s political class to absorb the cost of a new security order.
Druze politics adds another layer to this internal picture. Azzam said the debate is not simply about Israel, but about minority survival in a changing regional environment, especially after the war in Syria and renewed uncertainty over sectarian balances.
He said some of the tension involves competing views among Druze communities in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. In his view, many Syrian Druze see outside protection, including from Israel, as a matter of survival, while Jumblatt and other Lebanese Druze leaders fear that alignment with Israel could expose Druze communities to severe backlash from surrounding Muslim populations.
Azzam compared this to the Maronite experience during Lebanon’s civil war, when parts of the Christian leadership allied with Israel and later paid a heavy political price.
He said some Lebanese Druze voices would not object to alignment with Israel, but that their thinking is less about affinity for Israel than about minority survival in a region dominated by larger Sunni populations.
“Any other supporting minority works. Is it the Israelis? Is it the Iranians? It doesn’t matter,” he said. “And so it’s not very much pro-Israel there as much as it is anti-Sunni. This is for Lebanon, not for Syria.”
The agreement now rests on three unresolved questions: whether Israel will accept phased redeployments tied to Lebanese army deployment; whether Lebanon can dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure without provoking an internal crisis; and whether Iran’s influence will continue to limit Beirut’s ability to negotiate as a sovereign state.
The pilot-zone mechanism is designed to test implementation before the sides move toward a broader settlement. But it also shows why both governments remain cautious.
If the initial zones do not include meaningful Israeli redeployment, Lebanon may struggle to defend the agreement politically. If redeployment moves ahead without verified disarmament, Israel may view the process as a security risk.
For now, the deal is alive because none of the parties has a better immediate option.
Lebanon needs a path to Israeli withdrawal, civilian return, and reconstruction in the south. Israel wants Hezbollah pushed back from the border without relying only on repeated military operations. Washington wants to keep the Lebanon file from being swallowed by the Iran track.
The signing in Washington was a real diplomatic step. It was not a settlement. The agreement gives Israel, Lebanon, and the United States a process for moving forward, but it leaves the hardest question unresolved: whether the power to make or break the deal still lies partly outside the room where it was signed.
(The Media Line)
