Rekpene Bassey
Nigeria’s security forces routinely place themselves in extraordinary danger in every major security rescue operation. Often, they pay the ultimate price, to defend the nation.
But in the aftermath of every such operation, especially anti-kidnapping operation, a question quietly emerges. One that no press conference, victory parade or official communiqué can permanently silence.
And the question is: if the state can identify the perpetrators after the crime, why was it unable to prevent the crime in the first place? That question has resurfaced following the rescue of the abducted pupils and teachers from Oriire in Oyo State.
According to official accounts, the operation not only resulted in the rescue of the victims, it led to the arrest of several suspects and the disruption of the kidnappers’ network. President Bola Tinubu, indeed, stated that the operation dismantled elements of the militants’ support structure.
However, security analysts warned that militant groups are increasingly exploiting Nigeria’s poorly governed forests to expand their operational reach into the South-West.
Alongside theses verified developments, public speculation has circulated that relatives suspected of the suspected Oriire kidnappers were also taken into custody as part of the investigation process.
Those claims remain unverified, and no responsible analysis should treat them as established facts.
However, the speculation itself reveals something far more important than whether it is ultimately proven true. It exposes the profound crisis of confidence between Nigerians and the institutions charged with protecting them.
The public is increasingly asking whether Nigeria possesses an intelligence deficit. Or whether it suffers from an action deficit. These are not the same thing.
Intelligence Is Measured and modern intelligence services are judged primarily by attacks that never happen.
As it were, the world’s leading security intelligence agencies rarely celebrate successful responses as much as they celebrate successful prevention.
There is no gain saying that the greatest intelligence victories leave no dramatic headlines because there are no victims to interview. Plots are disrupted. Weapons are intercepted.
Safe houses are raided before they become operational. Kidnappers are arrested while planning, not while negotiating ransom. That is the essence of predictive intelligence.
Reactive policing, by contrast, begins only after innocent citizens have already paid the price. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s security doctrine still appears heavily weighted toward reaction rather than anticipation creating an intelligence-action gap.
On the flip side, Nigeria is not devoid of intelligence capability. The armed forces, the intelligence community, the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies have repeatedly demonstrated remarkable operational competence.
Terrorist commanders have been neutralised. Hostages have been rescued. Weapons caches have been seized. Financial networks have been disrupted.
Communication channels have been intercepted.
These achievements are real. But they still expose an uncomfortable intelligence paradox.
If investigators can rapidly identify escape routes, informants, financiers, logistics suppliers and operational cells immediately after an attack, citizens naturally wonder whether fragments of that same intelligence existed beforehand.
If they did not, intelligence collection requires strengthening. If they did, institutional responsiveness requires urgent reform. Neither possibility is reassuring.
Kidnapping rarely happens overnight. Professional kidnappings are among the most intelligence-intensive crimes imaginable. They require weeks of preparation. Targets are selected.
Movements are observed. Communication networks are established. Weapons are assembled.
Food supplies are arranged. Hideouts are prepared. Vehicles are secured. Negotiators are identified. Financial channels are organised. Every one of those activities creates observable signatures.
Effective intelligence systems are designed to detect precisely those signatures. This is why advanced security doctrine increasingly relies upon behavioural analysis, communications intelligence, financial intelligence, geospatial surveillance, artificial intelligence, predictive analytics and community-based human intelligence.
The objective is simple: stop the kidnapping before the kidnappers leave the forest.
The Oriire incident has once again highlighted Nigeria’s forests as strategic sanctuaries for insurgents, terrorists and organised kidnapping syndicates.
Analysts say these ungoverned and/or under-governed spaces provide mobility, concealment and operational depth for armed groups expanding into previously less-affected regions.
Forests do not merely conceal criminals. They expose governance failures. Where the state has little presence, criminal organisations establish their own.
Every ungoverned forest eventually becomes governed by someone else. History repeatedly demonstrates this principle; from Colombia to the Sahel. Nigeria is no exception.
Public confidence Is becoming the greatest casualty in Nigeria’s unfolding security scenario. Perhaps the greatest danger is not the kidnappings themselves. It is the erosion of public trust.
Every successful kidnapping rescue strengthens confidence temporarily. Every preventable kidnapping weakens it again.
When citizens begin believing that the government consistently “knows afterwards,” confidence in intelligence institutions gradually deteriorates.
Without public trust, intelligence becomes exponentially more difficult. Communities stop reporting suspicious activity.
Witnesses become reluctant. Informants disappear. Fear replaces cooperation. Security becomes even harder.
The legal question here is:
should investigators question relatives of suspects if they possess relevant information
Certainly!
No serious criminal investigation excludes family members where evidence justifies inquiry. But democratic societies operate on an equally important principle: Criminal liability is personal, not hereditary.
Investigative interest must never be confused with collective punishment.
Any perception that families are being targeted simply because of biological relationships risks undermining the legitimacy of otherwise lawful investigations.
The rule of law is not an obstacle to national security. It is one of its foundations.
Winning the war before the first shot is key here. Nigeria has reached the point where success can no longer be measured solely by the number of kidnappers arrested after operations.
The more meaningful metric is simpler: How many kidnappings never occurred because intelligence intervened early? That is how mature intelligence systems evaluate themselves.
The country requires deeper integration of national databases, biometric intelligence, financial surveillance, drone reconnaissance, satellite imagery, artificial intelligence-assisted threat prediction and seamless information sharing among security agencies.
Most importantly, intelligence must move from collection to anticipation. From observation to intervention. From reaction to prevention.
Again, let us reexamine the real test.The rescue of the Oriire victims deserves commendation.
The courage displayed by Nigeria’s security personnel should never be diminished. But commendation should not silence legitimate inquiry.
The uncomfortable question confronting Nigeria’s security establishment is not whether it can respond forcefully after criminals strike.
It has repeatedly demonstrated that capability. The question is whether the same institutional energy, intelligence resources and operational coordination can increasingly be deployed before innocent Nigerians are abducted.
Until prevention becomes the defining characteristic of Nigeria’s security architecture, every successful rescue will continue to be followed by the same haunting national question: if the state could find them afterwards, why could it not stop them beforehand?
That sounds like an intelligence paradox. Very much so!
Bassey is the Pesident of the African Council on Narcotics and a Security Specialist.
