Rekpene Bassey
Dawn in Nigeria’s North-East has too often become a period of reckoning. Not merely of loss, but of unanswered military strategy.
In the early hours of Sunday, 1 March, near Banki, Borno State, fighters linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launched a coordinated pre-dawn assault on a forward Nigerian Army position. The gun battle raged for hours.
By daybreak, Major UI Mairiga of the Nigerian Army lay dead alongside several soldiers, their bodies en route to a morgue in Maiduguri.
Others remain unaccounted for. This was no isolated episode. It was the latest in a steady drumbeat of violent engagements that have reshaped Nigeria’s counter-insurgency landscape.
The insurgency that erupted in 2009 has since claimed tens of thousands of lives. The United Nations estimates conservatively places conflict-related deaths in the north at 40,000, while displacement has reached around two million, with ripple effects throughout West Africa.
These numbers signal both human tragedy and operational persistence. They are not random figures but the figures of warfare, where insurgents seek not just territory but time, grinding down military resolve through attrition.
A Pattern of attacks on military formations seems to have been formed. It transpired that the Banki raid is far from unique.
In October 2025, insurgents ambushed a Nigerian Army convoy near Bama, killing two senior commanding officers namely Lieutenant Colonel AS Paiko (202 Tank Battalion) and Lieutenant Colonel SI Iliyasu (222 Battalion), as troops were en route to an offensive operation.
Earlier, in Malam Fatori, a remote gateway in northern Borno bordering Niger, a Lieutenant Colonel commanding the 149th Battalion was killed alongside approximately 20 soldiers when suspected ISWAP fighters overran the base after a gun duel that lasted over three hours.
Beyond recent years, this pattern stretches into the deeper history of the insurgency. In November 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Abu Ali, a decorated tank commander celebrated for his bold operations against militants, was ambushed and killed along with six other soldiers in Malam Fatori.
Another senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Sakaba, commanding a task force in northern Borno, fell during a heavy insurgent attack in November 2018; a reminder that the cost of leadership in this conflict is recurrent and steep.
And though details sometimes remain contested, militants have claimed high-profile killings of senior officers in separate engagements including assertions of Brigadier General M. Uba’s capture and execution during a patrol near Wajiroko, which the Army has publicly denied, which nonetheless indicates the intensity and ambition of these assaults.
From ambushes to overruns there has been tactical evolution. These incidents reveal an insurgency that attacks at scale and with purpose.
It has evolved from guerrilla harassment into more coordinated operations capable of striking not only outposts but critical mobility nodes, including supply convoys, battalion headquarters, and mechanised units.
This is thorough disconcerting, considering that multiple bases across Borno have so far been attacked: from Dikwa to Mafa, Gajibo to Katarko. These have come under simultaneous assault, forcing defensive postures and necessitating heavy air cover.
Tactically, this represents an insurgent adaptation to conventional deterrent strategies. Where once roadside ambushes and IEDs remained the insurgent repertoire, today’s militants execute night assaults, coordinate attacks across multiple fronts, and leverage the element of surprise in areas where terrain favours them: lake islands, riverine corridors, and rural hinterlands that complicate rapid reinforcement.
The larger picture here is a war for time, territory, and narrative. There is no gainsaying that the numbers matter because they reflect persistence, not paralysis. More than a decade into the crisis:
Tens of thousands have died.
Millions have been displaced. Military formations once deemed secure have been breached repeatedly. ISWAP and affiliated factions have not limited themselves to isolated hit-and-run attacks.
They have tested, probed, and exploited vulnerabilities in military strategy, revealing gaps in intelligence, force protection, logistics, and real-time response.
Forward operating bases, necessary as territorial anchors, have at times become static targets rather than dynamic launchpoints. Convoys, meant to convey force, can become ambush magnets without robust reconnaissance and route security.
And when base perimeters can be breached repeatedly, the psychological effect extends beyond the battlefield, eroding troop morale and public confidence alike.
Clearly, something needs to change. What Must Change?
To confront this evolving threat, Nigeria’s response must transcend mere tactical words and embrace strategic transformation giving preference to mobility over static defence.
Static bases provide geographic reassurance but invite systematic probing. A doctrine centred on mobile dominance, rapid reaction forces, unpredictable patrol patterns, and deeper integration of air and ground assets can deny insurgents their advantage of predictability.
Furthermore, intelligence as a force multiplier must effectively appropriate human and technical intelligence. In this light, intelligence cannot be siloed. Intelligence cycles must become real-time, integrated, and regionally harmonised, especially given the porous borders around the Lake Chad Basin that insurgents exploit with ease.
Force protection and early warning is key to tackling the challenge. Pursuant thereto persistent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), improved sensors, hardened perimeters, and counter-IED capacities are no longer luxuries. They are survival mechanisms in a theatre where militias test defences at night and retreat by dawn.
What is more, regional cooperation and shared strategy are equally critical. The insurgency is not confined to Nigerian soil. It flows across borders, implicating Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Effective counter-insurgency in today’s interconnected security environment requires coordinated multilateral operations, not episodic joint statements.
Narrative and civilian partnerships are equally profound factors. Effective counter-insurgency must align with civilian trust. Without secure local intelligence, community cohesion, and economic resilience, militant groups will continue to draw recruits and shelter.
Finally, from affectation to adaptation the question resonates. It is a valid question. “For how long shall they kill our soldiers?” This question is not merely rhetorical. It is a strategic indictment and a call to evolve.
Attrition may favour insurgents when time is their ally and strategy remains unimproved. But a state that learns faster, adapts more decisively, and integrates comprehensive security tools can bend the arc of conflict.
The dead, from Banki to Malam Fatori, from battalion commanders to frontline lieutenants, are not just figures. They are stark reminders that tactical courage must be matched by strategic clarity. Wars are not won by endurance alone; they are won by adaptation that outpaces the adversary.
Bassey is the President of the African Council on Narcotics, Drug Prevention, and Security Specialist.
