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Monitoring Criminal Money

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Rekpene Bassey

Every 15th of November presents the international community with an important opportunity to confront one of the most insidious and rapidly evolving threats to global security: transnational organised crime. As the world observes the International Day for the Prevention of and Fight against All Forms of Transnational Organized Crime, the 2026 theme, “Follow the Money. Stop Organised Fraud,” directs attention to a criminal enterprise whose sophistication, geographical reach and financial consequences increasingly challenge the capacity of national institutions and international law enforcement agencies.

It is a reminder that behind the apparent anonymity of online fraud lies an organised criminal architecture, driven by profit, protected by corruption and sustained by sophisticated financial networks.

Organised fraud has evolved beyond the conventional activities of individual confidence tricksters and opportunistic cybercriminals. It has become an industrial-scale criminal enterprise, incorporating financial deception, identity theft, investment manipulation, cryptocurrency scams, business email compromise, romance fraud, impersonation, extortion and other forms of cyber-enabled criminality.

Its distinguishing characteristic is not merely the technology employed but the organised infrastructure behind it. Criminal networks now operate through specialised cells responsible for intelligence gathering, victim profiling, digital penetration, psychological manipulation, financial transfers and the concealment of proceeds. This represents a transition from isolated criminal incidents to coordinated, network-enabled threat systems.

The financial dimensions are staggering. INTERPOL’s March 2026 Global Financial Fraud Threat Assessment estimates that global losses associated with financial fraud reached approximately US$442 billion in 2025, drawing on estimates by the Global Anti-Scam Alliance.

The same assessment reports a 54 per cent increase in fraud-related INTERPOL Notices and Diffusions since 2024. More significantly, INTERPOL supported member countries in over 1,500 transnational fraud cases involving approximately US$1.1 billion in lost assets.

These figures illustrate the extraordinary scale of the threat, although reported and estimated losses must be distinguished from the total proceeds actually generated by criminal networks. The implication is unmistakable: financial fraud is no longer a peripheral law-enforcement concern; it is a major international security challenge.

The United States provides another revealing illustration. According to the FBI’s 2025 Internet Crime Report, released in April 2026, the Internet Crime Complaint Center received 1,008,597 complaints, while reported losses approached US$21 billion. Of this amount, cyber-enabled fraud accounted for more than US$17.7 billion.

These figures represent reported American losses rather than the global total and do not capture every incident of fraud. Nevertheless, they demonstrate how rapidly digital criminality is expanding, even in jurisdictions with advanced financial regulation, technological infrastructure and investigative capabilities.

The message for governments everywhere is that economic sophistication does not confer immunity against organised deception.

What makes contemporary organised fraud particularly dangerous is its convergence with other forms of transnational criminality. Investigations increasingly reveal connections between online scam operations, human trafficking, forced criminality, money laundering, corruption and, in some regions, terrorist financing.

INTERPOL’s 2026 assessment identifies scam centres operating across several continents, with victims from nearly 80 countries trafficked into such facilities. Hundreds of thousands of individuals are believed to be involved, many of them compelled to perpetrate online fraud under conditions of exploitation and coercion.

This development fundamentally changes the security calculus: the individual answering fraudulent messages may himself be a victim of an organised trafficking enterprise. The criminal ecosystem therefore exploits both the intended victim and the person recruited to execute the deception.

Artificial intelligence has introduced another formidable dimension. Criminal networks are exploiting generative AI, deepfake technology, voice cloning and automated digital platforms to impersonate public officials, corporate executives, relatives and trusted institutions.

A few seconds of publicly available audio or video may provide sufficient material for convincing impersonation. Investment fraudsters can construct elaborate digital identities, fabricate testimonials and simulate credible financial opportunities.

INTERPOL’s 2026 assessment identifies AI-enhanced fraud as significantly more profitable than conventional methods, with some AI-enabled schemes estimated to be 4.5 times as profitable.

The intelligence implication is profound: digital authenticity can no longer be assumed, and traditional methods of identity verification must be reinforced by stronger authentication, behavioural analysis and independent verification protocols.

The operational sophistication of these networks deserves particular attention. Organised fraud is increasingly structured around a division of criminal labour. One group acquires personal information; another develops fraudulent communication channels; a third manages the victims; while specialised financial intermediaries receive, convert and redistribute the proceeds.

These intermediaries, commonly described as money mules, may operate through bank accounts, shell companies, cryptocurrency wallets and cross-border payment platforms. In some instances, legitimate businesses are infiltrated or manipulated to facilitate the movement of illicit funds.

This architecture creates layers of operational separation between the perpetrators, their victims and the ultimate beneficiaries. From an intelligence perspective, the challenge is to reconstruct the network, establish the relationships between its components and identify the individuals exercising strategic control.

It is here that the philosophy of Cui bono, who benefits? – becomes indispensable to financial investigation. The immediate recipient of a fraudulent transfer may not be the principal offender, just as the person controlling a digital wallet may not be the ultimate beneficiary.

Effective investigation must therefore extend beyond the first identifiable transaction to establish beneficial ownership, financial relationships, transaction patterns and the ultimate destination of illicit proceeds.

Financial intelligence, forensic accounting, open-source intelligence, digital forensics and human intelligence must be integrated into a coherent investigative framework.

The objective should not merely be to establish that fraud occurred but to identify the command structure, financing arrangements and operational networks sustaining it.

The international financial system has consequently become both a battlefield and an investigative environment. Criminal proceeds move through multiple jurisdictions, exploiting differences in financial regulation, weaknesses in customer identification procedures, anonymous corporate structures and gaps in information-sharing arrangements.

Cryptocurrency and virtual assets have further complicated the tracing of funds, although blockchain analytics also provide investigators with opportunities to identify suspicious transaction patterns.

The principle of follow the money therefore requires more than monitoring bank transfers. It demands the systematic examination of financial behaviour, digital footprints, beneficial ownership and the relationship between apparently unrelated transactions. Where the money moves across borders, the investigation must be equally transnational.

For Africa, the implications are particularly serious. The continent faces a combination of cyber-enabled fraud, illicit financial flows, institutional vulnerabilities and the growing penetration of transnational criminal networks.

The United Nations has highlighted the enormous economic cost of illicit financial flows, estimating that Africa loses close to US$90 billion annually, equivalent to approximately 3.7 per cent of its GDP. This figure encompasses a much wider range of illicit financial activities and should not be interpreted as fraud losses alone.

Nevertheless, it demonstrates the scale of resources being diverted from productive investment, infrastructure, healthcare, education and economic development. The growing intersection between financial fraud and terrorist financing in parts of the continent adds another dimension to the threat.

Criminal proceeds can become instruments for financing violence, destabilisation and the subversion of legitimate state authority.

Nigeria must view this challenge through the prism of national security, economic stability and institutional credibility. Its expanding digital economy, financial services sector and international commercial connections offer considerable opportunities for development, but they also create vulnerabilities that sophisticated criminal networks can exploit.

The country’s response must move beyond the conventional tendency to treat cyber fraud principally as an individual criminal offence.

Organised fraud requires a coordinated national security response involving the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit, the Nigeria Police Force, the Department of State Services, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian Communications Commission and other relevant institutions.

Their respective intelligence, investigative, regulatory and enforcement capabilities must be brought together through structured inter-agency cooperation.

More importantly, Nigeria needs to strengthen its capacity for financial intelligence-led policing. Suspicious transaction reporting, beneficial ownership verification, digital evidence preservation, cryptocurrency tracing and the identification of money-mule networks must become integral components of organised fraud investigations. Intelligence agencies and financial regulators should develop mechanisms for identifying emerging criminal typologies, mapping high-risk networks and generating actionable intelligence before criminal proceeds disappear into multiple jurisdictions.

The establishment and effective operation of coordinated anti-scam mechanisms, supported by financial institutions, telecommunications operators and technology companies, would significantly improve early detection and response. Prevention, intelligence collection and enforcement must operate as complementary instruments rather than disconnected institutional activities.

International cooperation is equally indispensable. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, commonly known as the Palermo Convention, provides an important legal and institutional framework for international cooperation against organised criminal networks.

However, its effectiveness depends on the willingness and capacity of member states to translate commitments into operational action. Mutual legal assistance, extradition arrangements, joint investigations, intelligence exchange, asset tracing and coordinated financial disruption must become more responsive to the speed with which criminal networks move their proceeds.

INTERPOL’s Global Rapid Intervention of Payments mechanism, I-GRIP, demonstrates the practical value of rapid international cooperation in intercepting suspected criminal transfers. Since its introduction in 2022, the mechanism has helped member countries intercept more than US$500 million in criminal proceeds, largely associated with cyber-enabled fraud.

Even so, the most consequential weakness in the global campaign against organised fraud remains the disproportionate attention paid to the perpetrators who execute the transactions rather than the financiers and principal beneficiaries who control the enterprise.

Arresting a fraudster is important; dismantling the criminal organisation is strategically more significant. Investigations must penetrate the financial command structure, expose the professional enablers, identify corrupt facilitators and recover the assets through which criminal networks sustain their operations.

The doctrine of cui bono must therefore inform the entire investigative process. Equally, nemo iudex in causa sua – no one should be a judge in his own cause, reinforces the need for independent investigation, impartial prosecution and judicial accountability, particularly where powerful interests or institutional complicity are suspected.

The ultimate measure of success should be the disruption of criminal capacity, not merely the accumulation of arrest figures.

The private sector also carries a substantial responsibility. Banks, fintech companies, telecommunications providers, social media platforms and cryptocurrency exchanges occupy strategic positions in the detection and prevention of organised fraud.

Their systems often encounter suspicious activities before law enforcement agencies receive formal complaints. Timely reporting, secure information-sharing arrangements, stronger customer authentication, transaction monitoring and rapid payment-recall mechanisms can significantly reduce the opportunities available to criminal networks.

Public awareness must equally be treated as a national security instrument. Citizens and businesses need to understand that unsolicited investment offers, suspicious payment requests, fabricated digital identities and urgent demands for financial transfers may be components of sophisticated criminal operations.

However, the burden of protection must not be transferred entirely to victims; institutions controlling the infrastructure must take responsibility for securing it.

Ultimately, the 15th of November should be more than another symbolic international observance. It should provide an opportunity for governments to reassess their intelligence capabilities, strengthen financial regulation, improve international cooperation and demonstrate measurable commitment to monitor criminal money in order to effectively disrupt the economic foundations of organised crime.

The central lesson of this year’s theme is that criminal networks cannot be comprehensively defeated by pursuing only the visible perpetrators while leaving their financial architecture intact. Money is the oxygen of organised fraud; intelligence is the instrument for locating its arteries, and coordinated law enforcement is the means of cutting off its supply.

Follow the money. Identify the networks. Disrupt the proceeds. Dismantle the enterprise. That is the strategic imperative of the global campaign against organised fraud.

BASSEY is Security Specialist and President of the African Council on Narcotics.

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