Rekpene Bassey
The arrest of Sani Yusuf, a sixth suspect in the 2022 massacre at St. Francis Catholic Church in Owo, is more than a law enforcement headline. It is a case study in patience, intelligence tradecraft, and the long shadow of insurgency in Nigeria’s evolving security landscape.
When gunmen stormed the church on 5 June 2022, killing more than 40 worshippers, the attack shattered a dangerous illusion that southwestern Nigeria was insulated from the jihadist violence that had ravaged the northeast and parts of the northwest for over a decade.
The bloodshed forced security planners to confront a sobering truth: the operational reach of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) was broader, more adaptive, and more clandestine than previously assessed.
The latest arrest by the Department of State Services (DSS), reportedly of an ISWAP commander who hid for four years in Edo State, underscores three strategic realities.
First, insurgent networks in Nigeria are no longer territorially confined. ISWAP, originally concentrated around Lake Chad, has increasingly adopted a dispersed cell structure. Operatives move across state lines, blending into civilian communities far removed from conflict epicenters.
The suspect’s relocation from Kano to Edo illustrates a classic counterintelligence tactic: geographic displacement to evade pattern detection and disrupt surveillance continuity.
Second, the case demonstrates the value of long-cycle intelligence operations. In counterterrorism, arrests are often the visible tip of an iceberg built on years of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), financial tracking, and inter-agency collaboration.
The patience required to track a fugitive for nearly four years reflects institutional memory and data retention capabilities that are frequently underestimated in public discourse.
Third, the arrest highlights a shift in ISWAP’s operational doctrine. Attacks such as the assault near Zuma Rock and the strike on the Suleja military barracks signaled a deliberate expansion from soft civilian targets to hardened security installations.
This dual-target strategy is designed to achieve psychological dominance: terrorize civilians while eroding confidence in state security forces.
The Owo massacre itself bore hallmarks of hybrid warfare: coordinated gunfire, explosive devices and rapid withdrawal.
It was intended not merely to kill but to communicate. In insurgent logic, symbolic targets matter. A church in a historically peaceful region amplifies sectarian fear and tests national cohesion.
The fact that the alleged commander reportedly confessed to involvement in multiple operations suggests cross-theater coordination within ISWAP’s command hierarchy.
Modern jihadist groups increasingly operate through decentralized franchises, but they retain strategic coherence through ideological indoctrination, encrypted communications and financial pipelines.
What allowed a high-profile operative to remain embedded in a rural Edo community for years? The answer lies in a mixture of operational discipline and local invisibility.
Insurgents survive by exploiting weak identity management systems, informal housing arrangements, and limited community-level counterintelligence awareness. In many Nigerian communities, tenancy documentation and biometric verification remain inconsistent, creating blind spots.
Nonetheless the same environment that provides concealment can also produce exposure. Counterterrorism successes often hinge on subtle anomalies: unexplained income streams, irregular movement patterns, coded communications or community tips.
Intelligence is rarely cinematic. It is granular.
The strategic importance of this arrest extends beyond justice for victims. It reinforces deterrence. Insurgencies thrive on the perception of inevitability and impunity. When high-value fugitives are eventually captured, it disrupts recruitment propaganda and weakens the myth of invincibility.
However, tactical victories must not obscure structural vulnerabilities. Nigeria’s insurgency ecosystem is sustained by porous borders, arms trafficking networks, youth unemployment and ideological radicalization pipelines. Unless these drivers are addressed, operational gains risk becoming cyclical.
There is also an inter-regional dimension. ISWAP’s linkages across the Lake Chad Basin demand synchronized intelligence sharing among Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Counterterrorism in West Africa is no longer a purely domestic affair; it is a transnational intelligence contest.
Equally critical is the protection of soft targets. Churches, mosques, markets and transport hubs remain attractive to extremists because they maximize fear with minimal logistical complexity.
Security architecture must therefore balance visible deterrence with discreet surveillance, community policing and rapid response capabilities.
The arrest in Edo carries a subtle warning: the insurgency has learned to decentralize. Security agencies must learn to anticipate. This requires predictive analytics, improved biometric databases and community-level early warning systems that integrate local leaders into formal intelligence loops.
Public communication also matters. Transparency about prosecutions, without compromising operational details, builds trust. Citizens are more likely to share information when they see credible follow-through in the justice system.
At a doctrinal level, Nigeria’s counterterrorism posture must continue shifting from reactive deployment to proactive disruption. Intelligence fusion centers, inter-agency data integration and financial intelligence tracking are not bureaucratic luxuries; they are strategic necessities.
The DSS operation reflects an understanding that counterinsurgency is not a sprint. Four years of pursuit culminating in one arrest may seem incremental. In intelligence terms, it is cumulative pressure; the steady constriction of operational space.
For the families who lost loved ones in Owo, no arrest can erase grief. But justice delayed, in this instance, has not been justice abandoned.
The deeper lesson is this: insurgent violence seeks to fragment nations along lines of fear. Effective intelligence work does the opposite. It restores confidence that the state can see, can remember and, ultimately, can act.
In the contest between extremism and constitutional order, persistence is power. The DSS long hunt for the mastermind of the Owo Church attack and its eventual success is worthy of commendation.
Bassey is the President of the African Council on Narcotics, Drug Prevention, and Security Specialist.
