Last week, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan for the 15th annual summit with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru.
While this was Modi’s eighth visit to Japan since assuming office, the last iteration of the high-level bilateral summit was held in 2022.
As a result, Modi’s visit concluded with a comprehensive set of outcomes, including a renewed 10-year India-Japan joint vision with eight clearly-defined focus areas and a joint declaration on security cooperation.
The visit also witnessed an impetus to India-Japan economic security cooperation. A focus on this area was first seen in 2024, when the two sides convened the India-Japan Dialogue on Economic Security, including Strategic Trade and Technology.
The two sides’ convergence on economic security was apparent during the two prime ministers’ participation in the India-Japan Economic Forum.
In his remarks, Modi hailed deepening India-Japan economic partnership as one between “trusted friends,” and “particularly relevant in the context of the present turbulent global economic scenario.”
Similarly, Ishiba voiced Japanese companies’ interest in exploring “partnerships between Indian talent and Japanese technology” to build resilient supply chains.
This alignment in the two leaders’ conception of India-Japan strategic partnership translated into another key outcome: the “Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange” to promote two-way exchange of skilled talent.
Moreover, Modi’s reference to the “turbulent global economic scenario” was pertinent, given the shared challenges faced by New Delhi and Tokyo.
India and Japan have both faced the ire of the United States, given the Trump administration’s focus on addressing long-standing market-access issues (chiefly, for U.S. agricultural exports) through the imposition of tariffs.
In addition, concerted efforts on economic security, supply chain resilience, and cooperation on next-gen technologies under the Quad framework face an uncertain future, with recent reports indicating that U.S. President Donald Trump may not visit India for the Quad Leaders’ Summit this year.
In addition, the global ramifications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry lend further credence to Modi’s point on pressing externalities and the resultant need for like-minded nations (like India and Japan) to shore up economic security through tech and supply chain partnerships.
On stemming China’s tech advances, the present Trump administration has built on the precedents of the Biden administration, which in turn drew from the previous Trump administration’s use of export controls and investment screening mechanisms. This Trump-Biden-Trump continuity on China-U.S. tech rivalry is now drawing other nations into the fray.
For example, nations like Singapore and Malaysia are stepping up regulatory compliance to clamp down against the transshipment of tech components to China.
The Trump administration’s country-by-country approach (as opposed to Biden’s tiered approach) on determining access to U.S.-made critical tech components has led to a scramble for semiconductors.
Only some countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have successfully navigated the resultant ambiguities to ink long-term partnerships with U.S. tech giants like Nvidia, AMD, Microsoft, etc.
Meanwhile, China has sought to highlight its own propositions as a credible alternative to American tech components.
This includes Huawei Technologies seeking to finalize export deals (for its Ascend 910B and 910C AI chips) with nations across the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Many nations have been caught between the binary choice of American or Chinese tech offerings. In May 2025, the U.S. warned against the use of Huawei’s Ascend processors, which it clarified were subject to export controls as they were “designed or manufactured using U.S.-origin technology.”
Moreover, China’s April 2025 retaliatory actions – chiefly over mandating licenses for export of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets – have impacted supply chains and manufacturing operations globally.
Unlike China’s December 2024 export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony for the U.S. alone, the wide-ranging restrictions have underscored Beijing’s willingness to leverage its dominance in the production and refining of critical minerals.
Last month, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi, India reportedly received assurances that China “will resume the much-needed supply” of fertilizers, rare earth minerals, and tunnel boring machines as the two countries normalize relations.
Meanwhile, Japan has reportedly made considerable strides in reducing its dependence on Chinese rare earths through strategic partnerships and coordination with its private sector.
For Japan, there are other direct implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry. The Trump administration has reportedly followed through on Biden-era efforts to level the global playing field for U.S. companies (like Lam Research, KLA, and Applied Materials), complying with curbs on China’s access to semiconductor equipment. This U.S. effort includes seeking similar compliance from Dutch and Japanese companies (chiefly, Tokyo Electron Ltd.).
In January 2025, Japan also mandated new export licenses (starting end-May 2025) from companies exporting advanced AI chips, high-end Lithography equipment and Cryocoolers.
With these unique but shared concerns over the global implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry, it was timely and pertinent that India and Japan finalized the India-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources.
This will help advance bilateral cooperation in supply chain resilience for critical minerals, including through the development of processing technologies and joint investments for exploration, mining, and stockpiling critical minerals.
The commitment for acting on such bilateral convergences on economic security was also reflected in the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit.
The Indian and Japanese prime ministers have “tasked their Foreign Ministries to accelerate policy level exchanges on economic security,” including identifying projects in strategic sectors, in tandem with industry and academia, and “protecting high technology trade while mutually easing export control challenges.”
Similarly, as illustrated by the announcement of the “Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange,” there was an evident bilateral intent to envisage long-term bridges between Indian and Japanese tech ecosystems.
“This was also reflected in the Indian and Japanese prime ministers emphasizing the ‘importance of support for startups’ and aligning on ‘promoting activities of startups of both countries in India, including through the Japan-India Startup Support Initiative (JISSI).”
During Modi’s visit, the two sides also highlighted developments on strengthening the semiconductor supply chain under the Memorandum of Cooperation on India-Japan Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership, which was finalized in July 2023.
Amid the new uncertainties plaguing the Quad, India and Japan rightfully also announced a dedicated track (one of eight) for cooperation on next-gen technologies under the renewed India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, which offers direction for deepening the India-Japan strategic partnership.
Moreover, similar to the Quad’s focus on harnessing AI for development aims and synergizing standards, India and Japan also launched the India-Japan AI Cooperation Initiative to encourage institutional cross-pollination (across academia and private sector) and collaborative programs like developing Large Language Models (LLMs), to foster “a trustworthy AI ecosystem.”
Underpinned with a renewed ten-year vision for the India-Japan strategic partnership, New Delhi and Tokyo hold immense potential for harnessing each other’s strengths to guard against challenges posed by the China-U.S. tech rivalry.
(The Diplomat)
