By Ahmed Yahaya – Joe
“We learn from history that we do not learn from history.” – Georg Hegel (1770-1831)
Why has Reno Omokri recently dubbed President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) as “Hurricane Tinubu”?
It is obviously not unconnected with the recent wave of political, military, and security appointments so far under the current dispensation.
Mr. Omokri’s ebullient mood is no doubt becoming increasingly infectious in many quarters as personally witnessed by yours truly.
Not particularly surprising from different sides of River Kaduna dissecting the onetime “deputy capital” of Nigeria a tall tale has emerged.
From the southern bank, going southerly a Beer parlour proclamation by an unrepentant opposition member from Zango Kataf, the hometown of the nominated CDS is said to have converted his seat to a rostrum announcing on Hausa, “Mun dakatar da kan mu daga wani kara a kotu akan zaben shugaban kasa.” – (I hereby recuse myself from any election petition against the President in court)
Meanwhile, from the northern bank northwards on various Tea seller’s tables many ruling party stalwarts remain clueless. They are said to be angrily wondering why PBAT picked a Kataf general in particular as Defence Chief.
Recall that less than 24 hours before the end of former Governor el Rufai’s 8 years in office he proscribed the Kataf umbrella association of which the new Defence chief is reportedly an integral member of.
This is either a remarkable coincidence or whoever the dickens in Game of Thrones-speak is PBAT’s “master of whisperers” is doing one heck of a job.
Add the appointment of Mr. George Akume as SGF to the fray, PBAT has less than a month in office set out to politically redraw the Middle Belt map.
All those partisan sentiments apart, my chief concern is over the one-time “Great Malabite” Law faculty undergraduate formerly known as Melford Dokubo Goodhead Jr. whose mind-boggling revelations preceded the recent slew of security and military appointments.
How credible were his claims at the Villa on Friday, June 16?
The antics of present-day Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo are perhaps on one hand a diversionary carpet bombing to soften the ground for Malam Nuhu Ribadu to transition from a Special Adviser on Security to a National Security Adviser on Monday, June 19.
If so, it was a classic political manoeuvre reminiscent of, “The hand of Esau but the voice of Jacob.”
Simply put, Asari Dokubo was put up to it.
Admittedly, on the other hand, it was probably an accomplished conflict entrepreneur merely playing out his own version of the Nigerian “Hypothesis of Corruption” as expounded as far back as 1988 by Pini Jason Onyegbaduo (1948 – 2013) which states that;
“The decibel of an average Nigerian’s public outcry is directly proportional to his distance from the opportunity to do exactly what he condemns.”
Against the foregoing background, it could be recalled back in September 2022 the now outgone President Buhari administration approved a business opportunity with security implications for Tompolo in the Niger Delta region on which Asari-Dokubo angrily reacted;
“So on what grounds did they give him the pipeline (surveillance) contract? Was he part of the struggle in Rivers, in Bayelsa? We have capable hands in Rivers and Bayelsa for pipeline protection. So why Tompolo?”
Reportedly, “Dokubo, the founder of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), in a video he posted on social media, is not happy that Tompolo got such a humongous and mouthwatering contract when he, (Tompolo) had never been involved in the Ijaw nor Niger-Delta struggle.
The ex-militant leader also wondered why Tompolo who is from Delta State, should be awarded a contract that would extend to Rivers and Bayelsa State when there are capable hands who should handle those parts.”
For “Hurricane Tinubu”, who obviously orchestrated Asari-Dokubo’s outing at the Villa there is massive collateral damage as the Commander in Chief naively discountenanced certain permutations – the present corps of nominated Defence and Service chiefs are fruits from the same poisonous tree that Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo with reckless abandon disassembled on national TV.
Going forward, PBAT must prepare for blowback because every move on the political chessboard attracts a countermove that can trigger off a myriad of unintended consequences further down the line.
While the home truths Asari Dokubo delivered remain incontrovertible, Churchill reminds us, “The truth is so precious that she must be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”
This means politically, what played out at the Villa with the ex-militant leader now a born-again patriot cannot be classified as a tolerable risk. It was an intolerable gamble. In leadership, there has to be skillful information management.
Why are Nigerians so emotionally invested in military and security appointments?
Beyond guaranteed local security in any given community, the beneficiary generals hail from, there is the rapid upward socio-economic mobility for the affected officers, their relatives, friends, and even hangers-on through a generous and complex web of “Welfare” that runs across Nigeria – a fast-tracked gentrification of sorts in a nation, “that confuses wealth with class and money with character.”
According to Mr. Eric Teniola, a retired Director at the Presidency;
“The last British Commandant of the Nigerian Army, then referred to as General Officer Commanding, GOC, but now named as Chief of Army Staff, Major General Sir Earle Christopher Welby Everard (1909-1996) was due for retirement in 1965, so the post of GOC was set to become vacant. There were four candidates vying for the post.
They were Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe (1924-1971) from Ago-Iwoye in Ogun state, Brigadier Zakariya Abubakar Hassan Maimalari (1930-1966), a prince from Maimalari village in the present Yobe state, Brigadier Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun (1923-1966) from Ondo city in Ondo state and Brigadier General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi Ironsi (1924-1966) from Umuahia-Ibeku in the present Abia state.
The four Brigadiers were commissioned in 1949. Brigadier Ironsi was NA/3, Brigadier Ademulegun was NA/4, and Brigadier Ogundipe was NA/6 while Brigadier Maimalari was NA/8. In his book on Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa entitled A Right Honourable Gentleman, Trevor Clarke, a British colonial administrator claimed that Major General Everard recommended Brigadier Ogundipe to succeed him while the former Premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello (1909-1966), the Sardauna of Sokoto, wanted Brigadier Ademulegun. Senior officers within the Army favoured Brigadier Maimalari.
In the end, the powerful Alhaji Ribadu, who was at that time, being referred to as ‘Deputy Prime Minister’ selected Brigadier Ironsi, a Congo war veteran, and was later promoted to Major General. The appointment according to Mr. Clarke was ‘contentious’ at that time.”
See details in the October 4, 2017 edition of Vanguard newspaper
Will the recent PBAT appointments eventually become contentious?
Nuhu Ribadu is on my mind because since the IBB era there have been 11 NSAs with only two former policemen occupying that office – onetime IGP Muhammadu Gambo Jimeta (1937-2021) and Rtd CP Ismaila Gwarzo both holding sway as back as in the 1990s.
Since then all previous NSAs have been retired Army generals and two Colonels, Kayode Are and Sambo Dasuki. Ribadu is now taking over an office deeply entrenched by successive serving and retired military boys: how will incoming loyalists from his primary constituency of the Police fit in?
That is why Ribadu’s appointment might probably resurrect that ancient professional rivalry between policemen and soldiers.
Closely looking at the PBAT list it can be noticed that the Brigade of Guards HQ and its core FCT-based battalion commanders at Asokoro and Gwagwalada including the State House military intelligence and armament COs are all from the South West.
The reason is obvious – the LP VP candidate’s audacious and open threat that borders on sedition and perhaps even treason on national TV, “Swearing in Tinubu is as good as swearing in a military regime.”
PBAT and his handlers should however note, President Shagari’s most loyal Guards officers that stood by him to the last at Aguda House on December 30-31, 1983 were Lt. Colonel Eboma and Captain Augustine Ayogo. None of those fiercely patriotic and committed officers shared the same ethnicity nor religion as their then Commander in Chief.
See details in pages 467 & 468 of Shehu Shagari: Beckoned To Serve: An Autobiography (2001)
On the IBB template of securing his presidency, the historian Max Siollun recounts;
“Settlement was sometimes pre-emptive and could occur months or years in advance. Babangida’s charming of the military could take the form of presents and donations to commemorate officers’ and their families’ weddings, births, deaths, or traditional festivals such as Christmas and Eid. A soldier who served in Babangida’s Brigade of Guards told me on Sallah, Babangida gave every soldier in the unit gifts including yards of brocade and goats.”
See details on p.134 of Soldiers of Fortune (2013)
Who says PBAT is not a civilian equivalent of IBB?
Nice smile. Iron teeth; “Creeps like a mouse but jaws like a lion.” – 48 Laws of Power p.27
It is just a question of time before every hero becomes a bore.
During the First Republic, all the service chiefs and IGP were from the Christian South and the sky did not fall.
But it almost did on December 29, 1989, when IBB sacked Defence Chief Bali alongside Ibrahim Alfa, Patrick Koshoni, and Gambo Jimeta respectively Air and Naval chiefs and IGP. The only notable exception was Abacha who was retained as Army chief.
The others were replaced by Air Marshal Nureini Yusuff, Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako, and Alhaji Aliyu Attah with IBB taking up the Defence chief portfolio himself – all Muslims.
It was the worst political mistake IBB committed in his 8 years in power. His reckless abandon laid the foundation for Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar’s to strike with near-deadly accuracy barely 4 months later. Despite IBB escaping by the whiskers it incubated the kind of paranoia in him which in turn created the enabling environment for the June 12 fiasco. Arguably.
Many pundits hold the badly rattled IBB never fully recovered from that putsch till he left office. Two important appointments followed the Orkar Coup attempt after the dust had settled: Major General Salihu Ibrahim whom even fellow soldiers refer to as a core professional “soldier’s soldier” became Army chief.
Then AVM Larry Koinyan and Rear Admiral Promise Fingesi were appointed into the Armed Forces Ruling Council implying prior lopsidedness.
But lest we forget, between 1968 and 1983 there were 3 Air chiefs (Ikwue, Doko, and Bello) all simultaneously Northern Christians. The Nigerian Navy set up in 1956 did not have its first Muslim chief till Murtala Nyako was elevated holding the flag between 1990 and 1992 as earlier mentioned.
Under President Shagari as of December 31, 1983, all GOCs were Northerners (Hannaniya, Jega, Buhari, and Lekwot) and it was not an issue. So was the Defence chief Gibson Sanda Jalo including the Army and Air chiefs Mohammed Inuwa Wushishi and Abdullahi Dominic Bello respectively.
Being from the former Sokoto State, President Shagari ensured his Brigade of Guards CO Bello Kaliel and Second Division GOC Muhammadu Jega overseeing the nation’s capital and Lagos CP Mamman Nasarawa were homeboys.
So was the DG NSO (now DSS) Aliyu Shinkafi and the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence Mohammed Aliyu Gusau. Meanwhile, other Northerners included the de facto number two at the Army HQ, IBB, and Military Secretary Tunde Idiagbon. For any coup to succeed 9th Mechanized Ikeja must be part of it. This is because in all failed coups so far in Nigeria, Ikeja has never been compromised. So, President Shagari entrusted that crucial unit to Sanin Nijeriya Muhammadu (later Sani Abacha also known as Sani Sabongari and eventually Sani Fagge)
Back then the only non-Northerners in President Shagari’s military and security architecture were IGP Sunday Adewusi and Navy chief, Michael Adelanwa yet Northerners were at the vanguard of overthrowing Shagari!
So why did Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu (1909-1965) then the Defense minister and also the grandfather of the immediate past First Lady, Aisha Buhari prefer the appointment of Ironsi?
It is partly because it takes more than seniority to make an Army chief if not Brigadier Wellington Umoh Duke Bassey (1918-1995), NA/1 would have been appointed in 1965. Obviously, there are so many other dynamics at play in any given officer’s career trajectory including the notion that “Most commanders are intelligent people. Not all of these intelligent people are smart commanders. That is to say, not all of these people make the best decisions for their commands.” – Retired 4-star US Army General Fred Franks Jr. on page 48 of his memoirs entitled Into the Storm: A Study in Command (1997)
In his 1981 book entitled Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup, Major Adewale Ademoyega asks, “How could the Nigerian Army be patriotic?”, answering himself, “The British themselves saw the Nigerian Army as purely mercenary.” He went on to state, “a good percentage of them (military officers during the First Republic) readily and willingly hobnobbed with politicians, in order to attain the highest ranks and positions” describing such as, “the kernel of the inevitable conflict” that eventually played out on January 15, 1966.
In April 1962, Ademoyega was the last university graduate to be granted direct short-service combat commission into the Nigerian Army by the Balewa administration due to lingering suspicions of political restiveness among more educated officers observed by British Intelligence which so advised the Nigerian government.
The first graduate to be commissioned as an officer was Odumegwu Ojukwu in 1958 and subsequently, Victor Banjo, Oluwole Rotimi, and Emmanuel Ifeajuna in 1961. Eventually, the cadet units at the University of Ibadan and Nigeria College (Ahmadu Bello University) from where TY Danjuma as an undergraduate had enlisted were shut down.
The fears of the government were not misplaced as events would later prove so when in 1964 Major Ojukwu attempted to recruit his colleagues Banjo, David Ejoor, and Yakubu Gowon for a coup as General Ejoor who eventually became an NDA commandant and later on Army chief elaborates in his Reminiscences (1989).
By 1966, Majors Ifeajuna and Ademoyega would play key roles in the gruesome events that terminated the First Republic.
The Northern intelligentsia is the first in Nigeria to realize the future potential of military involvement in politics and acted accordingly using Ironsi as camouflage.
Take for instance, why former President Buhari in his own words actually join the Nigerian Army in the first place back in 1962;
“The Emir of Kano told one of us that if soldiers could overthrow a line of kings descended directly from the Prophet, it could happen anywhere. So, we should go and join the army.”
See details on page 18 of Shehu Musa Yar’adua: A Life of Service (2004) by Jacqueline W. Farris
In 1959, on the eve of national independence, there were 58 Nigerian-born Army officers. Only 7 were from the North. The Northern officers were respectively in order of seniority Zakariya Maimalari, Kur Mohammed, James Yakubu Pam, Abogo Largema, Yakubu Gowon, Hassan Usman Katsina, and Shehu Lawan. All of them being Government College, Zaria old boys. The school that had started as Katsina College in 1922 relocated to be Government College in the 1940s eventually becoming Barewa College in the 1960s which has so far produced 3 Army chiefs: Gowon, Katsina, and Lt. General Abdulrahman Bello Danbazau rtd, a Zaria classmate and NDA course mate to the incumbent Sultan of Sokoto, Rtd. Brig. General Sa’ad Abubakar.
Out of the Barewa 7 of 1959, 4 died on January 15, 1966. Apparently, rivaling Barewa in the turnout of generals in the North are the Government Colleges at Bida and Kano those days.
The reason?
Nigeria’s minister of Defence under the last British Governor-General was Balewa who introduced with British approval an officer recruitment template that highly favoured Arewa which by 1963 under Ribadu stood at North 50%, West 21%, East 25%, and Midwest 4%.
This is perhaps part of the background of the sage advice by the then Emir of Kano given to Shehu Musa Yar’adua as earlier recalled by Muhammadu Buhari.
Both had retired as Major Generals after enlisting in the Nigerian Army on the same day at Jaji near Kaduna in 1962. Prior they had also been secondary school classmates in Katsina.
How did the present-day South West fare back then?
That geopolitical region has now produced its second Army chief since the Shagari-era of Lt. General Ipoola Alani Akinrinade who was in office from October 1979 to April 1980;
“Yorubas of the Western Region still looked down on a career in the military. By 1966, out of 10,500 officers and men, Yorubas numbered about 700 instead of a projected 2205 based on quota.”
If so, what of elsewhere in the South?
“In the Midwest (now Edo and Delta states) interest was particularly high in the Anioma areas. In the East, recruitment from the Cross River, Ogoja, and Rivers provinces which had been a source of many soldiers during the Second World War declined as economic opportunities there increased. On the other hand, interest in the core Igbo groups increased.”
See details in History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria (Part II) by Dr. Nowa Omoigui
The attached picture which features a quartet of visiting soldiers from the Southern Nigeria Regiment of the West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF) to the United Kingdom for the coronation of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra in 1902 is very instructive.
This is because Captain Sowaribi Tolofari formerly of the Military Police in his 2004 book entitled Exploitation and Instability in Nigeria: The Orkar Coup in Perspective, went on and on, bitterly complaining of the “Hausa-Fulani” domination in the Nigerian armed forces citing General Yakubu Gowon as a prime example.
How could such an outstanding commissioned officer who risked his life in the direct assault on Ojo Cantonment during the April 22, 1990 coup attempt (albeit escaped out of the country thereafter) not know Gowon is neither Hausa nor Fulani?
Indeed, “Many southerners cannot visually distinguish the Hausa from other northern ethnicities such as the Kanuri, Nupe, and Gwari. More significantly, southerners also often reflexively misuse the term “Hausa” as a generic descriptor for all northerners.”
The Southern Nigeria Regiment is the ancestor of the Ibadan-based 4th Battalion during the First Republic which became the Second Division of the Nigerian Army under Gowon with then Lt. Colonel Murtala Mohammed as pioneer GOC in 1967.
The attached 121-year-old picture was captured on camera by Sir John Benjamin Stone (1838-1914) in London. It used to belong to the House of Commons library before it was donated to the National Portrait Gallery in 1974.
Is there anything as the notion of “Hausa-Fulani” as put by Tolofari and even by others elsewhere?
“A Pullo, that is a Fulani individual, is a Pullo, precisely because he is not a Kado, that is a non-Pullo then how could someone be a Pullo and a Kado at the same time? This is a contradiction in terms. It is meaningless.”
Why then are the gun carriers in the attached picture labeled “Hausa”?
John Edward Phillips in his book Spurious Arabic: Hausa and Colonial Nigeria (2000) observes;
“When Frederick Lugard assumed control of the Royal Niger Company’s territories on 1 January 1900, few of his soldiers, much less the other inhabitants understood English. Queen Victoria’s proclamation of the Protectorate was read to the troops in Hausa and Nupe. Lugard discovered that Hausa was widely known ongoing many speakers of various small languages in the area, and was commonly used as a lingua franca.”
He goes on, “Lugard was a military man, who had a military understanding of language’s utility. The language was a code. Lugard’s officers needed to understand the enemy’s code while denying the enemy the ability to understand their own. This military consideration dictated the use of Hausa as the language of conquest and administration,”
Who was Lugard’s enemy?
It was then the Sokoto Caliphate.
In his own words hear him, “Our recent experience has taught us that the pagan Gwaris, Kedaras, and other tribes yield none in bravery. They all speak Hausa, and I hope to enlist many as soon as we get in touch with them at the new headquarters. It is, in fact, my desire to make the West African Frontier Force, as far as possible, a Hausa-speaking pagan force, and I am convinced that it will thus be a far more reliable source of military strength.”
See details in Northern Nigeria Annual Reports, 346, 1900-1901, 23.
It can therefore be easily gleaned that a deliberate British policy of Divide and Rule was applied in the North against itself and subsequently in the North against the South as Dr. Nowa Omoigui recounts;
“In May 1952 there was a serious mutiny by clerks of southern Nigerian origin at the Command Ordnance Depot, Yaba over living conditions. Two British officers were wounded and the mutiny was crushed when northern riflemen from the infantry were moved in.
The resolution of this mutiny by the British high command exploited a deliberate cleavage in the regional origins of men in the rank and file (who were typically northern) versus those in the trades (who were typically southern). Such inbuilt organizational tensions bequeathed by British recruitment policies which served them well, later complicated civil-military and civil-security relations in post-independence Nigeria.”
Fellow Nigerians, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” – George Santayana (1863-1952)
