By Ahmed Yahaya-Joe
“We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution to establish the dictatorship. The object of power is power.” – George Orwell (1903-1950)
For discerning Nigerians old enough to recollect, 1986 was a very tumultuous year partly over the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) controversy which culminated in the resignation of the Number Two in the General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida-led junta.
Was the rumpus that sharply divided Nigerians over OIC really religious?
With the benefit of longstanding insight, the final analysis in the Newswatch magazine edition dated October 20, 1986, properly summarizes the fundamental issue devoid of any primordial sentiments with the headline;
“Power Games Ukiwe Loses”
How did what actually started out as an internal power struggle among those who conspired, planned, and executed the removal of the previous Buhari-Idiagbon regime in August 1985 reverberate outside Dodan Barracks as a disturbingly intense religious embroilment in the polity?
Recall the IBB regime was on public relations life support after the Vatsa Coup attempt and the economically punishing fallout of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) afflicting Nigerians.
As such desperately needing political endorsement from an “alienated” Northern Muslim establishment concurrently accusing IBB of being “too Middle Belt and Southern oriented” the regime acted surreptitiously in a bid to deliver a fait accompli to turn the tide calming Arewa nerves.
Ukiwe’s naivety in not properly reading the dynamics and even his lack of basic understanding that “the object of power is power” by any means necessary including IBB’s gradual implementation of “one makes the revolution to establish the dictatorship” did not help matters.
General Sani Abacha (1943-1998) therefore decisively seized the moment as Brigadier General (later Senator) David Mark recounts;
“Those who were in Babangida’s caucus would remember vividly that it was Abacha who single-handedly removed Ukiwe because there was an argument on who should be second-in-command.”
(See details in Newswatch magazine edition of April 11, 1994)
What type of demand is President Tinubu currently making on himself to navigate through the conflicting narratives afflicting him in office?
The question is pertinent because no two political titans have ever victoriously emerged after assiduously plotting to ascend the highest office in Nigeria like IBB and Asiwaju nearly 40 years apart. Political greatness did not just land on their laps. Both painstakingly sought it separately to “grab it, snatch it, and run with it.”
A common denominator between them Bashorun MKO Abiola (1937-1998) had this to say about the military strongman;
“Anybody who knows my friend as closely as I have known him since 1966, will realize something is propelling him. The type of friends he had, the type of things he was reading, the type of things he got interested in, the type of life he led, the type of demand he made on himself over the years.”
(See details in p.68 Soldiers of Fortune: Nigerian Politics from Buhari to Babangida 1983-1993 by Max Siollun)
Interestingly, ahead of the June 12, 1993, polls David Mark later, Senate President 2007-2015 would threaten at a Villa meeting;
“I’d shoot Chief Abiola the day NEC (now INEC) pronounces him as elected president.”
(See details in p.166 The Tale of June 12: Betrayal of the Democratic Rights of Nigerians by Prof. Omo Omoruyi)
In conclusion, what are the political lessons for President Tinubu 38 years after the controversial resignation of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe?
1. According to Walter Benjamin (1892-1940);
“Every epoch not only dreams the next; it bears its end within itself and reveals it by ruse.”
Simply put, by spearheading the removal of Ukiwe, Abacha positioned himself as the de facto “Khalifa” (Successor) to IBB even adopting the epithet irrespective of the “ordained” political dream of Abiola. That Abacha led the military faction that forced IBB to eventually “step aside” was a classic fulfillment of Benjamin’s dictum.
Similarly, Asiwaju’s greatest threats and worst political enemies are currently within his government and not in the opposition camp or civil society.
2. Nobody in power can always please and satisfy every section in such a complex and diverse nation like Nigeria concurrently. Accused by the so-called core North for being “too Middle Belt and Southern” in his governance as earlier mentioned, the South was, in turn, deeply concerned the Babangida regime was “too Hausa dominated.”
The truth, however, is that;
“In much of southern Nigerian discourse, the terms “Hausa” and “northerner” are indistinguishable and interchangeable. Most Southerners did not realize that Babangida himself was not Hausa.
A regime dominated by northern minority officers pleased none of the major ethnic and religious groups.”
(See details in p. 114-115 Siollun)
The moral here is that Nigerians will always loudly have their say, but the government will always contrive ways to have their way.
3. Never take contrary opinions in Nigeria for granted. Despite relishing being nicknamed by the irritant “Lagos-Ibadan axis of the Nigerian press” as “Maradona” later dubbing him as an “evil genius,” Babangida skillfully dodged one political bullet after the other by a combination of subterfuge, camouflage, and practiced chicanery.
As such, he was totally blindsided by the rising quantum of discontent against his regime. He grossly underestimated the buildup of events that later precipitated many unintended consequences.
For instance, General Babangida never saw coming to the level and extent of reputational damage the “Ango Must Go” of May 1986 at ABU, Zaria would resound nationwide with unfortunate deaths and injuries would have on his government.
After a 5-month closure of affected campuses upon reopening with a series of conditionalities imposed on returning students the Federal Military Government also set up a panel of inquiry headed by a distinguished jurist, Justice Mustapha Akanbi to which Police PRO, Superintendent Alozie Ogugbuaja representing the Lagos Command described the key driver of the crisis;
“The Army is the unregistered political party of Nigeria. Since the military had come into politics in Nigeria, it will not be in its interest to have an effective, and efficient police force capable of foiling a coup. On a weekday, you see military officers drinking pepper soup and beer at midday. No wonder they have time to plan coups.”
Mr. Ogugbuaja’s effrontery shook the psyche military ruling class to its core, which reacted with a series of panic measures. The furore that played out arguably laid the foundation for the SAP Riots and the ferocity of the Niger Delta (Orkar) coup attempt, which followed down the line.
4. Since politics is the continuation of war by other means, the conscientious use of Bonaparte’s concept of “manoeuvre sur les derrieres,” cannot be overemphasized and interpreted in 33 Strategies of War by Robert Greene;
“When you attack people directly, you stiffen their resistance and make your task that much harder. There is a better way; Distract your opponent’s attention to the front, then attack them from the side, where they least expect it.”
The boiling controversy accompanying Nigeria’s full membership of OIC soon fizzled out. The rage was quelled by Nigeria’s gradual restoration of full diplomatic relations with the State of Israel and the introduction of government-sponsored Jerusalem pilgrimage.
It, therefore, must have been a watershed moment for many Nigerians combative 38 years ago when former President Goodluck Jonathan led the Nigerian delegation to the OIC Conference of Heads of State at Cairo in 2013.
5. Commodore Ukiwe eventually discovered the hard way that “there was a government within a government and he was an outsider,” after he was summoned to a crucial meeting of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) presided by Babangida who lavishly celebrated the personal virtues and dedication to service of his Number Two leaving the rest to Abacha and other political snipers.
Ukiwe’s abysmal lack of support base from his Navy constituency was the final blow as highlighted in p.147 of then Defence chief’s 1993 memoirs entitled Domkat: A Biography of General Domkat Bali by Femi Ahmed
The rest is still living history with the naval chief, Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Augustus Akhabue Aikhomu (1939-2011) succeeding the Abriba Sailor;
“A man who did not rock the boat, which suited all parties as Aikhomu, did not cause problems for his coup-hardened colleagues.” – p.110 Siollun
The concluding lesson for President Tinubu from Ukiwe’s fall is what is known as “Zizek Trilemma” which explains the impossibility of any political appointee demonstrating true loyalty under any ruler while having high integrity and being very bright;
“Of the three features – personal honesty, sincere support for the regime, and high intelligence – it is only possible to combine only two, never three. If one were honest and supportive, one was not very bright; if one were bright and supportive, one was not honest; if one were honest and bright, one was not supportive.”
– Slavoj Zizek (b. 1949) Philosopher, Cultural theorist, and Public intellectual
