Egypt’s reported airstrikes on a Rapid Support Forces (RSF) military supply convoy in Sudan on 9 January could mark a pivotal moment in Sudan’s civil war, moving its northern neighbour up a gear from cautious diplomacy to decisive action.
According to some media reports, the strikes targeted a convoy in a border triangle between Egypt, Sudan, and Libya.
Armoured vehicles and other supplies were allegedly heading from Libya to bolster the RSF, a big militia based in Darfur, which is fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
Cairo has tried to execute a balancing act since civil war erupted in April 2023 but has recently felt like its red lines are being crossed.
Egypt backs the SAF to safeguard Sudan’s unity, territorial integrity, and state institutions, but the RSF’s most prominent backer is the United Arab Emirates, which is the biggest foreign investor in Egypt and a key Cairo ally.
For almost three years, Egypt has pursued every diplomatic avenue in the hope of curbing the RSF’s advances, but these efforts have come to nothing.
Today, Egypt faces a broken state to its south in Sudan, and another to its west in Libya. Together, this constitutes a major national security issue. With failed negotiations and escalating threats along its borders, Egypt appears ready to move beyond words, prioritising direct enforcement over prolonged restraint.
The war in Sudan has crossed borders and now poses an existential threat to Egypt’s security and vital lifelines if Sudan fragments into smaller, unstable entities.
The spillover is already tangible. Over a million Sudanese refugees have fled to Egypt, adding to Cairo’s economic pressures. Bilateral trade between Egypt and Sudan, once valued at around $1.4bn annually, has now all but dried up.
Sudan has been a key ally of Egypt in safeguarding its freshwater from the Nile River. The loss of that ally is more impactful given Egypt’s current standoff with Ethiopia over the latter’s newly inaugurated Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which now controls the flow and can be weaponised in times of drought.
The Sudan conflict also endangers another Egyptian lifeline: transit fees from the Suez Canal.
The billions of dollars this adds to the national coffers have long been a cornerstone of Egyptian revenue, but Houthi attacks against merchant shipping in the Red Sea have led operators to reroute vessels around the southern and western coasts of Africa instead.
For Egypt, the confidence of shipping companies to sail through the Suez Canal (by far the shortest route from Asia to Europe) is important, so it is a concern that some international actors now appear willing to back the SAF in exchange for a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast, potentially adding yet another destabilising factor to an already fragile maritime environment.
With failed negotiations and escalating threats along its borders, Egypt appears ready to move beyond words
Another headache for Cairo was Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late December 2025, heightening fears of an emerging Israel-Ethiopia axis, with Tel Aviv seeking a Red Sea naval base to gain access to the Gulf of Aden and Yemen at the expense of Egypt’s maritime position.
Given this wider context, Sudan’s unravelling is no distant crisis. Rather, it adds more pressure on Egypt when it comes to water supplies, economic impact, and geostrategic vulnerabilities.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar’s visit to Hargeisa earlier this month came amid talk of expanded cooperation and security arrangements, sharply heightening Cairo’s concerns of an emerging Israeli presence near the Gulf of Aden, potentially encircling Egypt’s maritime interests.
Landlocked Ethiopia has long sought direct access to the sea. Taken together, this tightens a strategic noose around Egypt, endangering freedom of navigation and economic lifelines such as the Suez Canal.
The war in Sudan is part of the wider turmoil engulfing the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The same foreign actors involved in Sudan also reportedly back actors in other torn states, such as Yemen and Libya.
Such activity could be seen as deliberately weakening already fragile states, deepening their fragmentation, and turning them into poxy battlefields.
In Sudan, the RSF’s aggressive territorial gains, particularly in the west, seem designed to split the country into two irreconcilable halves: the RSF dominating mineral-rich Darfur, and the SAF dominating the east, encompassing the strategically vital Red Sea coast centred on Port Sudan.
If clashes extend eastward towards the coast, further splintering is likely, creating openings for external powers to exert influence in the Red Sea.
Egypt’s deepening role in Sudan’s civil war has long been anticipated in light of Cairo’s increasingly firm rhetoric, not least in December 2025, at a meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
In an official statement, Egypt invoked the 1976 joint defence agreement, asserting its “full right” to take all necessary measures under international law to protect its red lines, including the preservation of Sudan’s unity, territorial integrity, and state institutions, framing any threats as direct dangers to Egyptian national security.
The reported Egyptian airstrikes on 9 January came just two days before Libyan commander Saddam Haftar was due in Cairo for urgent talks with Egypt’s defence minister and chief of staff.
Haftar’s father, Khalifa, is the de facto leader of eastern Libya, having led the Libyan National Army (LNA) since 2015, and Saddam Haftar is the LNA’s chief of staff.
The talks centred on military cooperation, border security, and curbing arms flows through southern Libya, a longstanding source of tension between Cairo and Tobruk, where Haftar is based.
The LNA is thought to have been supplying the RSF with weapons originating from abroad.
Egypt’s hardening stance was reinforced on 14 January when al-Sisi met US envoy Massad Boulos in Cairo, telling him that Egypt would not allow efforts to undermine Sudan’s stability.
In this, Egypt appears to be on the same page as Saudi Arabia, which recently intervened in southern Yemen to halt a secessionist push, loosely mirroring Cairo’s efforts in Sudan.
Together, these actions signal a concerted push by key Arab powers to restore the regional balance, preserve state integrity, and block a fragmentation agenda that seeks to exploit weak states for leverage.
While the path ahead remains arduous, Egypt’s involvement in Sudan and Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen may mark the opening salvos in a determined bid to avert further implosion across the region.
(Al Majalla)
